him of winning a decisive victory. As Swinton *well* points out, this was not a case of a general being required to undertake "the execution of a plan which he considers faulty. . . . The scheme of an advance against Manassas[2] cannot be called * faulty/ or of a kind to hazard the ruin of the army."

McClellan showed his lack of knowledge of the world in insisting with such obstinacy on his own scheme when he ought to have known that the constant, cordial, and unfaltering support of the Administration must be a condition essential to his success, no matter what plan he might adopt. This support he wilfully forfeited at the outset, and he did so, knowing perfectly well that he was doing so.

Again, what judicious officer would fail to take note of the fact that the embarrassments and difficulties which always beset untried troops, when they take the field for the first time, would inevitably be multiplied by embarking and disembarking them, and by operating in a country hitherto unknown, and where everything in the matter of communications and subsistence had to be extemporized? [3] And when one takes into account that McClellan had no accurate knowledge either of the

topographical features of the Peninsula, or of the

[1] Swinton, 97.
[2] The same would be true of an advance against an enemy lying behind the Rapidan.
[3] See McClellan to Thomas, April 9, 1862 ; 14 W. R., 84; also Assistant Secretary Tucker's letter to Mr. Stanton, April 10 [ir], 1862, in McClellan's O. S., 275 ; 14 W. R., 90.